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Learning from the Process of Decision: 
The Parenting Plan∗ 
Francis J. Catania, Jr.∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In her recent overview of women’s rights and family law,1 Herma 
Hill Kay succinctly characterizes the divorce reform movement of the 
1960s, the “full-scale campaign to reverse the no-fault revolution” 
that accompanied the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first no-fault di-
vorce statute,2 and the continuing debate as academics line up on ei-
ther side of the issue.3 She concludes that “the landscape of family 
law reform” will continue to be dominated by such debates well into 
the present century,4 ending on a hopeful note that acknowledges 
the complexity of moral issues and the breadth of passionate opinion 
and belief while urging continued exploration and consolidation of 
valued reforms.5 Though I expect that many would disagree with 
Professor Kay’s feminist characterizations, there is undeniable value 
in the bold strokes of her article. They present a manageable and ac-
cessible overview of some of the great tensions that inspire and in-
form modern family law and their histories. These same great ten-
sions can be said to have inspired and informed the American Law 
Institute’s (“ALI”) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 
(“Principles”) and even to be inspiring the founding question of the 
symposium for which this article was prepared: Do the ALI Princi-
 
 ∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Family Dissolution Princi-
ples, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on February 1, 2001. 
 ∗∗ Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, B.A. 1973, Dickin-
son College; M.A., 1976, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1983, The Dickinson School of 
Law. Thanks, for continuing inspiration regarding the wonders of the parent-child relation-
ship, to my parents and children. 
 1. See Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of 
Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. 
L. REV. 2017 (2000). 
 2. Id. at 2081–82. 
 3. Id. at 2081. 
 4. Id. at 2091. 
 5. Id. at 2092–93. 
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ples tend to strengthen or deconstruct families? 
Two authors cited in the Kay article, and the lines attributed to 
them, provide insight into the ongoing divorce debate from some-
where near its poles. Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht writes of no-
fault divorce laws as having “played an indispensable role in the near-
destruction of marriage.”6 Professor Ira Mark Ellman writes that 
proposed counterreforms are likely to “increase the number of mar-
riages that are, at any given time, legally intact but factually dead, to 
keep many victims of failed marriages from building new lives for 
themselves and their children, and perhaps to increase the proportion 
of children born out of wedlock.”7 
Professor Ellman’s mention of divorcing spouses who are “build-
ing new lives for themselves” refers to the “clean break” theory, 
which flourished in the no-fault “revolution.” The doctrine “assumes 
that both members of a divorcing couple are better off if they can cut 
ties with one another and start their lives afresh.”8 It is no coinci-
dence that both Professors Spaht and Ellman refer to the children of 
dissolving marriages in the quotations above.9 The “interests” of 
children of divorce is one of the main rallying points for argument 
about no-fault divorce. While the “clean break” theory developed in 
response to property considerations at divorce, it was soon perceived 
as permeating all aspects of no-fault divorce.10 The idea of a “clean 
break” between spouses divorcing upon the realization—either con-
sensual or unilateral—that their marriage is irretrievably broken (re-
gardless of potential claims of marital fault) seemed to be a Gordian 
 
 6. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Le-
gal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 69–70 (1998), quoted in Kay, supra note 1, at 2083. 
 7. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why 
Reformers Should Look Instead to The American Law Institute, 11 INT’L J.L. POL. & FAM. 
216, 225 (1997), quoted in Kay, supra note 1, at 2082. 
 8. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 809, 846 (1998). 
 9. Professor Spaht quotes Paul Amato and Alan Booth, whom she describes as “two 
left-of-center authors” posing a cost-benefit analysis that brings children squarely into the di-
vorce equation: “Spending one-third of one’s life living in a marriage that is less than satisfac-
tory in order to benefit children—children that parents elected to bring into the world—is not 
an unreasonable expectation.” Spaht, supra note 6, at 66–67 (quoting PAUL A. AMATO & 
ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 238 
(1997)). 
 10. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property 
Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2313–18 (1994); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Mar-
riage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1241 (1998). 
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knot-cutter of an idea in the 1970s, against a background of decades 
of bitter litigation over marital fault and the unseemly institutionali-
zation of collusion among matrimonial lawyers and judges,11 and in 
the rosy glow of emerging social and legal norms of racial and gen-
der equality and individual privacy and autonomy. Whatever sense 
the “clean break” theory made in the allocation of property and in-
come in the aftermath of divorce, its effect on families with children 
only began to be noticed later. Parents were sorted by child custody 
laws into fairly rigid categories of “custodial parents” (an approxima-
tion of the parental ideal from the intact family—with, perhaps, ex-
cessive expectations on individual parents) and “noncustodial par-
ents” (parents—most often fathers—who exercised the lesser share of 
custodial and perhaps decisionmaking responsibility; parents with 
whom the children were not “at home”). Social scientists observed 
the increasingly common phenomenon of noncustodial parents’ es-
trangement from their children. This appeared to be at least one ex-
planation for the shockingly bad child support statistics in the United 
States through the seventies and eighties.12 Of even more concern 
 
 11. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Norms: Social Norms and the 
Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1940 (2000); Jane C. Murphy, Rules, 
Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 
60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1175 (1999). 
 12. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 
VA. L. REV. 9, 36 (1990). Examples of such statistics follow: 
• From 1970 to 1981, the number of divorces in America doubled. 
• From 1970 to 1981, the number of children living with only one parent 
increased by 54 percent to 12.6 million, one of every five children in 
America. 
• Of the 4 million women who were owed child support in 1981, only 47 
percent received the full amount due, and 28 percent received absolutely 
nothing; the aggregate amount of child support payments due in 1981 
was $9.9 billion, but only $6.1 billion was actually received. 
• From 1970 to 1981, the average amount of child support received by 
mothers rose from $1,800 to $2,110 per child, but after adjusting for in-
flation, the payments actually decreased by 16 percent in real terms. 
• In 1982, only 15 percent of divorced or separated women were awarded 
alimony, and only 43 percent of those women actually received full pay-
ment of the alimony they were owed, meaning that child support is the 
only form of assistance most divorced women can expect from their ex-
husbands. 
• Between 1970 and 1981, the number of people in families below the 
poverty level that were headed by women rose by 54 percent, while the 
number of male-headed poor families decreased by 50 percent. 
• In 1981, women headed almost 50 percent of all the poor families in 
America. 
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were studies that indicated that noncustodial parents were losing 
touch altogether in their relationships with their children,13 leading 
to the growing perception that, for many fathers, “marriage and par-
enthood are a package deal. Their ties to their children, and their 
feelings of responsibility for their children, depend on their ties to 
their wives. . . . [I]f the marriage breaks up, the . . . ties between fa-
thers and children are also broken.”14 
Legal scholars have speculated that this kind of de facto ration-
ale, borne of the “clean break” theory, undermines social and legal 
norms of parental commitment.15 This social and legal dislocation 
coincided with a fascinating, if problematic, moment in the evolution 
of modern family law. The “best interests of the child” standard has 
been widely touted as the standard by which child custody disputes 
are adjudicated in the United States since the nineteenth century. 
The standard was certainly an improvement over ancient property-
based approaches to child custody.16 It had seemed an adequate, if 
less than elegant, standard when viewed through the prism of mater-
nal preference rules. By the latter part of the twentieth century, how-
ever, the “best interests” standard was proving to be maddeningly 
indeterminate, as gender preferences were found unconstitutional or 
were simply dropped in an era of raised consciousness about gender 
equality.17 Thus, the prospect of litigation involving expensive law-
yers and experts as hired-gun character assassins further undermined 
the relationships of families involved in child custody disputes. 
Professor Elizabeth Scott, in her influential article Rational Deci-
sionmaking About Divorce,18 writes about the social norms that un-
derlie parenting. For many people, she argues, “[t]he value of chil-
 
See JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 11 (1986) (citing BUREAU OF THE 
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NO. 130, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1982)). 
 13. See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT 
HAPPENS WHEN PARENTS PART 35 (1991). 
 14. Id. at 118. 
 15. See Scott, supra note 12, at 36. 
 16. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 849. “Although the prevailing best-interests-of-the-
child standard expresses the right societal message about the responsibility of parents to put 
their children’s interests first, the standard is not determinate enough to produce predictable 
results.” Id. 
 17. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Devine v. 
Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). 
 18. See supra note 12. 
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dren in a life plan is both basic and complex; it derives from a desire 
to pass on a cultural and personal heritage, to instill values, skills, and 
interests, and to enjoy the companionship of persons sharing a 
unique and insoluble bond.”19 She goes on to suggest that the pro-
fundity of the parent-child relationship in the lives of most parents 
would support “[a] regime that encourages long and careful consid-
eration about the decision to divorce by parents of minor chil-
dren,”20 and that such a regime in the law of marriage and divorce 
“would reflect broadly shared societal values.”21 The regime she pro-
poses would involve precommitments to substantial mandatory delay 
periods for parents seeking divorce who have minor children,22 more 
substantial child and spousal support obligations,23 property distribu-
tion schemes that would be beneficial to minor children of the mar-
riage,24 and possibly requirements of counseling, mediation, or men-
tal health evaluation of the children before a divorce would be 
permitted.25 The fundamental premise of her proposal is that “[b]y 
imposing additional costs on divorce, precommitments also would 
indirectly encourage cooperative behavior during marriage and pro-
mote more careful consideration of the decision to marry.”26 Profes-
sor Scott emphasized that “a regime of mandatory rules promoting 
commitment to marriage is justified only to protect the interest of 
minor children.”27 She argued that “the sense of moral responsibility 
to one’s own children continues to be important to most persons”28 
and that, therefore, “many would be willing to accept a greater risk 
of error in the application of precommitment theory in pursuit of the 
objective of protecting the welfare of their children.”29 
More than a decade after Professor Scott’s brave proposal, the 
debate about whether easy access to divorce is undermining the fam-
ily roars on. Professor Scott may have underestimated the degree to 
 
 19. Id. at 25. 
 20. Id. at 89. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 91. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Scott, supra note 12, at 91. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 38. 
 27. Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. at 91. 
 29. Id. 
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which attempts to alter the availability of divorce would inspire those 
for whom personal liberty is more important than relationship values, 
or the degree to which the prospect of continuing in a marriage “le-
gally intact but factually dead”30 holds more fear and loathing than 
that of raising children with an estranged co-parent. She may have 
overestimated the degree to which even earnest and highly motivated 
parents would be willing to risk a precommitment regime, given 
some of the potential problems with such a regime that she acknowl-
edges.31 But her premise—that a sense of moral responsibility to 
one’s own children is a broadly shared societal value—is reflected in 
chapter 2 of the ALI Principles—and in a context in which consensus 
about what that sense can achieve in the best interests of children 
generally is perhaps more likely. 
The past fifteen years have seen a spirited reexamination of child 
custody law and have resulted in trends and countertrends as state 
legislatures attempt to come to terms with the realities of child-
custody disputes. First, the notion of parents sharing child custody 
equally (or near equally) swept the nation. Newspapers, magazines, 
and television documentaries ran stories of children going home to a 
different household on alternating weeks or parents taking turns liv-
ing with the children in the designated custodial home.32 In reaction 
came studies and articles challenging the effectiveness of joint cus-
tody.33 Next came the primary caretaker doctrine, with the attractive 
 
 30. See Ellman, supra note 7, at 225, quoted in Kay, supra note 1, at 2082. 
 31. See Scott, supra note 12, at 56. 
 32. See, e.g., Dorothy Anderson, Joint Custody Ensures Neither Mom’s Nor Dad’s 
Role Ends With Divorce, CHI TRIB., Jan. 8, 1986, at 12; Nadine Brozan, When Children 
Have 2 Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1984, at 598; Linda Bird Francke et al., The Children 
of Divorce, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 1980, at 58; Ted Gest et al., Divorce: How the Game is 
Played Now, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1983, at 39; Aric Press et al., Divorce 
American Style, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42; Denise M. Topolnicki, Love and Money, 
MONEY, Apr. 1982, at 176; Diane Wagner, Two Families Adjust to New Routines, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1981, at C19. 
 33. See, e.g., Kenneth K. Berry & Deborah Karras, Custody Evaluations: A Critical Re-
view, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 76 (1985); Alan Carlson et al., Child Custody Deci-
sions: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1989); Richard Chasin, M.D. & Henry Grune-
baum, M.D., A Model for Evaluation in Child Custody Disputes, 9 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 43 
(1981); Carol R. Lowery, The Wisdom of Solomon: Criteria for Child Custody from the Legal 
and Clinical Points of View, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 371 (1984); Andrew P. Musetto, The 
Role of the Mental Health Professional in Contested Custody: Evaluator of Competence or 
Facilitator of Change?, 4 J. DIVORCE 69 (1981); see also Ted Gest, Feminizing the Law: The 
New Meaning of Equality, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 17, 1991, at 48; LynNell Han-
cock, Putting Working Moms in Custody, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 54; Judith Regan, 
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premise that many of the pains and uncertainties of child custody de-
cisionmaking could be avoided by presumptively basing custodial 
and decisionmaking responsibilities upon the history of parent-child 
relationships while the family was intact. Again, there was a wave of 
scholarship and some legislation that embraced the idea, followed by 
a wave of criticism. Today, a small number of states have some type 
of preference for joint custody arrangements, while a slightly smaller 
number explicitly disfavor such arrangements.34 And while only one 
state uses a primary caretaker presumption, a number of states explic-
itly require courts to consider past caretaking in making custody de-
terminations.35 
II. CHAPTER 2 OBJECTIVES 
Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles—the principles concerning the 
“Allocation of Custodial and Decisionmaking Responsibilities for 
Children”—is the latest manifestation of this long and thorough in-
quiry, and it has the potential to be a culmination. Chapter 2 is the 
result of careful examination of the custody laws of the states, past 
and present, as well as scholarly studies and proposals from the 
United States and abroad. The Reporter36 has taken great care in set-
ting objectives37 for the chapter, which are designed to avoid polariz-
ing debate and yet promise to right some of the most ineffective or 
counterproductive aspects of child custody law. 
The objectives break down into three essential categories: (1) 
improving determinacy and predictability in the law of custodial and 
decisionmaking responsibility; (2) respecting and enhancing family 
autonomy by maximizing the effects of choices made by family 
 
An Open Letter to Mr. Clark, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 57; Jan Hofmann, Joint Cus-
tody: It’s Not Easy on Divorced Couples or Children, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1989, at 7; Nick 
Sheff, My Turn: My Long-Distance Life, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1999, at 16; Stephanie Simon, 
Joint Custody Loses Favor for Increasing Children’s Feeling of Being Torn Apart, WALL ST. J., 
July 15, 1991, at B1; David Streitfeld, Jury is Still Out on Question of Joint Custody; Often 
Not Feasible Because of Legal, Geographical and Emotional Roadblocks, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 
12, 1986, at 5B. 
 34. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.09 cmt. a, at 152 (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part I, March 20, 1998) 
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I)]. 
 35. Id. § 2.09, at 153–58. 
 36. Katharine T. Bartlett has served as the Reporter since 1994, and Grace Ganz Blum-
berg served in 1993 and 1995. 
 37. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.02, at 23–29. 
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members, not by the court or the state; and (3) codifying and insti-
tutionalizing fairness concerning race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual 
orientation, sexual conduct, economic circumstances, and functional 
relationships. 
A. Improving Determinacy and Predictability of the Law of 
Custodial and Decisionmaking Responsibility 
There seems to be consensus that the “best interests of the 
child” standard is a conundrum to parents, lawyers, and judges 
alike.38 Absent the predictability afforded by the maternal preference 
standards of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and 
with little or no guidance provided to courts by equally mystified (or 
politically hamstrung) legislatures, custody adjudication under the 
“best interests” standard has been almost universally excoriated for 
its indeterminacy.39 In 1975, Professor Robert Mnookin made the 
provocative suggestion that a coin flip to determine custodial and 
decisionmaking responsibilities might be just as informed40 as the 
typical “best interests” adjudication, and would probably be more 
fair,41 less expensive, more expeditious, less painful to the parties and 
children, and could even have a positive effect upon private negotia-
tions between the parties.42 Professor Mnookin went on to state: 
 
 38. Id. § 2.02 cmt. c, at 32. The author participated in a panel discussion before the 
Family Court Section of the Pennsylvania State Trial Judges’ Conference in February of 1994, 
in which the frustration of a number of judges with the standard they were asked to apply in 
child custody cases was expressed by one judge in a tearful plea for help and by another in a 
red-faced tirade. 
 39. The reporter cites the “classic critiques of the best-interest-of-the-child test” as in-
cluding Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child 
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary 
Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 499–500 (1990). See PRINCIPLES (Tentative 
Draft No. 3, pt. I), Introduction, at 2 & n.3, supra note 34; Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: 
Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987); Martha Fineman, 
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decision-
making, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in 
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1986); Robert 
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Func-
tions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975). 
 40. “Individualized adjudication (under a ‘best interests’ standard) means that the result 
will often turn on a largely intuitive evaluation based on unspoken values and unproven predic-
tions.” Mnookin, supra note 39, at 289. 
 41. Each possible outcome would have an equal chance regardless of race, gender, etc. 
 42. See Mnookin, supra note 39, at 290. 
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“While judgments about what is best for the child may currently be 
beyond our capacity in many cases, this need not be true in fifty 
years. Movement toward better judgment implies, however, that 
judges and decision-makers as a group learn from the process of de-
cision.”43 Half of those fifty years have now elapsed. The publication 
of chapter 2 of the ALI Principles gives us a natural vantage point 
from which to evaluate what we have learned in some twenty-five 
years. It gives us the opportunity to ask whether the proposals in 
chapter 2 are based upon what we have learned from the process of 
decision and whether they are likely to strengthen or weaken fami-
lies. 
For purposes of this inquiry, the “process of decision” is defined 
as the whole legal and social system concerned with parental rela-
tionships with children, including (1) decisions to be made by indi-
viduals considering parenting, (2) decisions to be made by parents 
considering ending their intimate relationship with one another, (3) 
decisions to be made by estranged parents about parenting, and (4) 
decisions to be made by courts in the event of impasse between es-
tranged parents of a child. The “process of decision” will also be 
considered as the behavioral science of decisionmaking; it is particu-
larly useful for the insights it provides into the problem of coopera-
tion and its application to parenting. 
After twenty-five years, it is clear that we have learned some 
things from the process of decision. One is that parents (and indi-
viduals considering parenthood) will be unable to make informed 
and considered choices about their relationships with their children 
and with each other as long as the decisionmaking process continues 
to be (1) indeterminate, (2) subject to the whims and biases of deci-
sionmakers outside the family, (3) subject to poor information about 
the intentions of the other members of the family, and, therefore, (4) 
unpredictable.44 Another lesson learned from the process of decision 
is that predictable decisionmaking requires clear, determinate, and 
easily-applied rules.45 We have learned that parental agreement is, 
generally speaking, good for children and that it is difficult for courts 
to improve measurably on parental agreements about parental deci-
 
 43. Id. at 291. 
 44. See Scott, supra note 12, at 13. “Research in decision theory suggests that cognitive 
biases, haste, and poor information may cause decisionmaking error.” Id. 
 45. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 1. 
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sionmaking and caretaking.46 We have learned that greater predict-
ability is achieved through structured, yet highly individualized, deci-
sionmaking principles.47 We have learned that preserving existing 
child-parent attachments after the breakup of a family unit is critical 
to a child’s well-being.48 And we have learned that any decisionmak-
ing process will need qualifications or exceptions to protect against 
unacceptable results.49 
In Professor Carl Schneider’s terms, an indeterminate system of 
laws is not exercising its facilitative, expressive, channeling, or even 
its arbitral functions properly.50 In the case of the law of child cus-
tody, the system is not reliably usable to give legal effect to the pri-
vate arrangements of parents concerning custodial and decisionmak-
ing responsibilities for their children (facilitative). It is not reliably 
usable to provide a voice in which parents may speak about their re-
lationships with their children and each other (expressive). It is not 
reliably usable to create or support social institutions to serve desir-
able ends51 (channeling). And it is not even reliably usable to help 
resolve people’s disputes (arbitral).52 
B. Respecting and Enhancing Family Autonomy 
The Reporter writes, in the Introductory Discussion of chapter 
2, about the importance of developing rules for allocating responsi-
bility for children that are predictable, so as to “facilitate thoughtful 
planning by cooperative parents while minimizing the harm to  
children caught in a cycle of conflict.”53 The expressive,54  
 
 46. Id. at 10. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. § 2.02, at 26. 
 49. Id. at xxv, 11–13. 
 50. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 495, 497–98 (1992). 
 51. One example is defined role expectations for what have come to be known as “non-
custodial” parents, and for stepparents. 
 52. Mnookin and Kornhauser use a medical analogy to question whether many legal 
disputes are “iatrogenic”—that is, induced and created by lawyers who are ostensible problem 
solvers. They conclude that little is known about the extent to which legal representation facili-
tates dispute settlement and the extent to which it hinders dispute settlement. Mnookin & 
Kornhauser, supra note 39, at 986. 
 53. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 1 (emphasis added). 
Professor Schneider points out that the institutions of family law “offer people models for or-
ganizing their lives.” Schneider, supra note 50, at 507. When these models “have presumably 
worked for many other people,” they come to be “part of a menu of social choice.” Id. Of the 
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channeling,55 and arbitral56 benefits of predictable rules are clear as 
well. Another thing that we have learned about the process of deci-
sion, as the Reporter acknowledges, is the tension between the ob-
jective of predictability across the broad range of custodial circum-
stances and the need for decisionmaking that is individualized to 
each family’s circumstances.57 The objective of respecting and en-
hancing family autonomy by maximizing the effects of choices made 
by family members follows quite logically from the objective of im-
proving predictability and determinacy. There is a time-honored tra-
dition in the United States of placing “broad and near-absolute”58 
responsibility and authority in parents in intact families for the care 
and custody of their children.59 When a relationship between parents 
 
essence of such an institutional facilitative and channeling function is predictability. 
 54. Professor Bartlett wrote in 1988 of a system in which parents would participate “in 
the creation of their own meanings [of their own relationships with their children] and further 
public meanings of responsibility in parenthood.” Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parent-
hood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 326 (1988). In a dispute resolution system that expresses important 
social values in its words and in the ways that it acts, parents can predict the effect on the reor-
dering of their own family and react accordingly. Bartlett predicts that “[a]s more of these dis-
cussions take place, our understanding of what should matter will evolve and, hopefully, im-
prove. While this process may lack the simplicity and administrability we prefer, it appropriately 
reflects the complex values and tensions that questions about parenthood entail.” Id. 
 55. Referring to channeling, one commentator has stated: 
The channeling function helps tell the people involved in an institution, the world in 
general, and the law in particular that those people stand in a particular relation to 
each other. When people marry, they, the world, and the law know that they have 
assumed special obligations to each other. . . . When a child is born in wedlock, the 
parents, the child (eventually), the world, and the law know that the parents have 
taken on special responsibilities to their child. 
Schneider, supra note 50, at 520. While Professor Schneider uses these words to make the 
point that a key tool of the channeling function is the disadvantaging of alternatives to the in-
stitution being promoted, the point is that the channeling function is effective only if the 
norms are clear and the consequences of adhering to them or ignoring them predictable. 
 56. Id. at 507. Schneider uses marriage as an example of the importance of having a dis-
pute resolution function that “provid[es] rules and a forum in which to adjudicate . . . dis-
putes” and “provides norms of behavior which may help the parties resolve some of their dis-
putes privately.” Id. 
 57. Simply put, “responsiveness to individualized circumstances requires judicial discre-
tion, but this discretion can undermine uniformity and predictability of results.” PRINCIPLES 
(Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 1; see also id. § 2.02 cmt. c, at 32–35. 
 58. Id. at 5. 
 59. The Reporter observes that “the primary importance of the family in private lives, as 
well as its significance in U.S. constitutional case law, is reflected in the very limited degree of 
official oversight and control over . . . its internal relationships.” Id., Introduction (I)(e), at 7. 
The Reporter cites to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158 (1944); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) in support of this obser-
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begins to dissolve, however, the principle of family autonomy is on 
much shakier ground. Indeed, as the Reporter observes, in most 
states the laws require judicial review of any agreement between es-
tranged parents concerning child support or child custody.60 The 
need for such review is obvious, but the substitution of the discre-
tion of the court—with its limited fact-finding ability and its imma-
nent biases—for the nuanced understanding of family dynamics in-
herent to each family member is too often less than optimal. Thus, 
the Reporter set out in chapter 2 to resort as much as possible to the 
committed relationship that likely exists between parents and their 
children,61 while acknowledging the importance of the protective 
function of the judicial presence in the process.62 
C. Codifying and Institutionalizing Fairness 
Of the main objectives of chapter 2, the pursuit of fairness in 
such matters as race, religion, sexual orientation, sexual conduct, 
economic circumstances, and functional relationships has, of course, 
the greatest potential for controversy. “Law typically follows, rather 
than leads, social change,” observes Professor Kay.63 And family law 
has followed (sometimes helping, sometimes hindering) a trend of 
social change as the twentieth century progressed toward a more 
egalitarian society. Some egalitarian developments of the last century 
appear to be beyond question or challenge.64 Others are the object 
of intense and sophisticated debate.65 While there is widespread ac-
ceptance of the notion of limits on government discrimination on 
the basis of gender, there is also a broad and persistent mistrust of 
two ideas: (1) that traditional gender roles should be eliminated, and 
 
vation. 
 60. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.07 cmt. a, at 85. 
 61. Id., Introduction (II)(b), at 10. 
 62. Schneider says “[o]ne of law’s most basic duties is to protect citizens against harms 
done them by other citizens.” Schneider, supra note 50, at 497. 
 63. See Kay, supra note 1, at 2091. 
 64. See, e.g., Palmore v. Disoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) (concerning racial discrimination); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 
2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (concerning gender discrimination). 
 65. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (concerning grandparent custodial 
rights); Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996) (concerning same-sex marriage); see gen-
erally PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, ch. 2 (addressing custody for 
de facto parents and parents by estoppel); see also id. ch. 6 (addressing domestic partnerships). 
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(2) that traditional gender roles should be preserved.66 The Reporter 
points out that the emerging trend in the law of custodial and deci-
sionmaking responsibility for children is to prohibit discrimination 
on these bases in the decisionmaking process, noting that such dis-
crimination usually reflects prejudices in the system and its partici-
pants.67 In fact, the Principles explicitly codify prohibitions on basing 
custodial decisions on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual orienta-
tion, extramarital sexual conduct, or economic circumstances.68 The 
Reporter does not presume that the Principles, where adopted, will 
effectively end such discrimination in the application of these laws, 
cognizant as she is of the subtlety of the stereotypes involved.69 But 
she emphasizes that the basis for provisions in the Principles codify-
ing and institutionalizing fairness and equality is that the biases ad-
dressed too often take the place of “a rational assessment of the 
child’s welfare.”70 As an example, she cites the treatment of the sex-
ual orientations of parents in custody decisionmaking. She acknowl-
edges the controversy surrounding this issue, but points out that the 
debate, while considerable, is a moral debate and one that need not 
apply to the pressing question of the caretaking and decisionmaking 
on behalf of a particular child. The relevant moral question, if there 
is one, is of the well-being of the particular child.71 The Reporter 
takes the position that the debate over the morality of the various 
sexual orientations can be moved away from the custody decision-
making process by limiting that process to the more scientific ques-
tion of parental conduct and demonstrable harm to the child. Stan-
dards for homosexual conduct and heterosexual conduct are treated 
identically in the Principles, under the heading of “extramarital sex-
ual conduct.”72 This is another filter designed to keep the more sub-
tle biases out of the decisionmaking process. The same approach is 
taken with religious practices73 (as distinguished from religious be-
liefs)—again as a matter of conduct. A similar but slightly different 
 
 66. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 500 
(1999) (cited in Kay, supra note 1, at 2091). 
 67. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 15. 
 68. Id.; see also § 2.14. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 853. 
 72. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.14(1)(e). 
 73. Id. § 2.14(1)(c). 
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approach is taken with economic discrimination.74 The emphasis on 
distinguishing conduct/actual harm from orientation/belief is un-
derscored by a passage in chapter 2 that expressly permits a court to 
consider any parent’s ability to care for a child, including the ability 
to meet the child’s needs for a positive self-image, regardless of a 
parent’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual orientation, sexual con-
duct, or economic circumstances.75 
III. THE PARENTING PLAN 
At the core of chapter 2 of the ALI Principles is an attempt at re-
versing the trend toward the clean break as a social norm in child 
custody dispute resolution: Topic 2—The Parenting Plan.76 By plac-
ing this concept at the core, the Reporter institutionalizes the prem-
ise that “the preservation of existing child-parent attachments after 
the breakup of a family unit is a critical factor in the child’s well-
being,”77 and that “each parent ordinarily will play an important on-
going role in the child’s life.”78 
Professor Bartlett has indicated that, in her view, the failure of 
the joint custody and primary caretaker presumptions to take hold in 
the law of child custody is in large part due to the fact that each of 
those roles “assumes some ideal norm for all post-divorce families.”79 
In some jurisdictions, that norm has been preference for joint cus-
tody: parents of a particular child have shared—and would continue 
to share—all custodial responsibilities for the child. In other jurisdic-
tions, that norm has been primary caretaker: one parent or the other 
was—and would continue to be—the primary caretaker of the child. 
Again, these approaches are susceptible to disputes pertaining to who 
will possess and control the child, and how. The Principles require 
that each parent “seeking a judicial allocation[80] of custodial respon-
 
 74. Id. § 2.14(1)(f). 
 75. Id. § 2.14(2). 
 76. Id. § 2.06 cmt. a, at 66. “The parenting plan is a core concept of this chapter.” Id. 
 77. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 27. The Reporter goes 
on to note that “[s]uch attachments are thought to affect the child’s sense of identity and later 
ability to trust and to form healthy relationships.” Id. 
 78. Id., Introduction, at 8–9. 
 79. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 851–52. 
 80. Note that the language here seems to miss an opportunity to encourage parental 
negotiation and agreement, instead envisioning an impasse that must be resolved by adjudica-
tion. 
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sibility or decisionmaking responsibility”81 file a proposed parenting 
plan with the court.82 The proposed plans are to be supported by 
disclosing information (“to the extent known or reasonably discover-
able” by the parties), in affidavit form,83 concerning the caretaking 
and other parenting responsibilities performed by each parent during 
the preceding twenty-four-month period, as well as child-care sched-
ules, school and extracurricular activities, and parental work sched-
ules.84 Once the proposed parenting plans are on the table, the Prin-
ciples give strong preference to voluntary agreements between the 
parties.85 In fact, the parties are explicitly told that they may file a 
joint plan.86 The rationale here is that “parental agreement is, gener-
ally speaking, good for children, and that it is difficult for courts to 
accomplish meaningful review that is likely to improve measurably 
those agreements.”87 
Chapter 2 also entails a change in the terminology of child cus-
tody law by which the Reporter hopes to express “the ordinary ex-
pectation that both parents have meaningful responsibilities for their 
child at divorce.”88 This focus on what may seem to be a semantic 
detail is an indication of the importance the Reporter has placed 
on—to quote from a 1988 article by Professor Bartlett—the “struc-
ture and expressive meanings of the law—especially the kind of ar-
guments the law urges the participants to make, and the construction 
of the parent-child relationship (and the concept of “the good par-
ent”) those arguments foster.”89 
In chapter 2, the terms “physical custody,” “partial custody,” 
“visitation,” and the like are replaced with “custodial responsibility,” 
and the term “legal custody” is replaced with “decisionmaking re-
 
 81. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06(1). Note the use 
of the term “allocation” rather than “award.” 
 82. Id. 
 83. This is presumably to underscore the importance of truthfulness. Note the verifica-
tion requirements in some state plans. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.377 (West Supp. 
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-220 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.194 (West 
1997). 
 84. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06(1). 
 85. Id. at 10. 
 86. Id. § 2.06(1). 
 87. Id. at 10; see also Bartlett, supra note 8, at 851. 
 88. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, Introduction,  at 9. 
 89. See Bartlett, supra note 54, at 294–95. 
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sponsibility.”90 The rationale for these changes is the prospect of “re-
construct[ing] the nature of disputes over children from who will 
possess and control the children”—a conceptualization redolent of 
the property regime from which clean break theory stems—“to what 
adjustments in family roles will be most appropriate for the child.”91 
In further acceptance of the notion that family members know 
best the dynamics of their own relationships, the parenting plan pro-
visions avoid “empirical and normative assumptions about the fam-
ily,” such as the joint custody or primary caretaker presumptions.92 
Instead, custodial responsibility93 is allocated to each parent in ap-
proximate proportion to that parent’s share of such responsibility 
while the family was intact. This idea of approximation of allocation 
of custodial responsibility, in addition to expressing deference to the 
idea of each parent’s ongoing role in the child’s family,94 is designed 
to do two things. First, it sets the scene for “structured, yet highly 
individualized decisionmaking,”95 in service of the objective of in-
creased predictability. And second, it helps to create an environment 
for constructive negotiation between parents about what adjustments 
to their roles in the child’s family will be most appropriate.96 That 
environment gains stability in the shadow cast by the more struc-
tured and predictable decisionmaking process, as well as from the 
 
 90. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, Introduction, at 9; 
see also id. §§ 2.06(1), 2.09, and 2.10. The term “custodial responsibility” refers to “the 
child’s living arrangements, including with whom the child lives and when, and any periods of 
time during which another person is scheduled by the court to have caretaking responsibility 
for the child.” Id. at 110. The term “decisionmaking responsibility” refers to “the authority to 
make decisions with respect to significant areas in the child’s life.” Id. at 187. This includes, 
typically, education and health care. It may also include “permission to enlist in the military, 
drive a car, work, participate in school sports, and sign a contract.” Id. 
 91. Id., Introduction, at 9. 
 92. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 852 (emphasis added). 
 93. Responsibility for the child’s living arrangements, including with whom the child 
lives and when and any periods of time during which another person is scheduled by the court 
to have caretaking responsibility for the child. 
 94. The Reporter credits Professor Elizabeth S. Scott with being the first advocate of an 
approximation standard for allocating child custody. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, 
pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.09 cmt. b. 
 95. Id. at 10. 
 96. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 85 (1981). “[A]fter 
divorce, mother, father, and children may all have a different conception of who is in their im-
mediate family” and “one can no longer define ‘the family’ . . . except in relation to a particu-
lar person.” Id. 
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explicit expressions of preference for voluntary agreement.97 
Supplementing and enhancing the parenting plan provisions in 
section 2.06, the Principles address allocation of significant deci-
sionmaking responsibility (the former “legal custody”) with an ex-
plicit preference for resolution by agreement of the parents.98 They 
go on to assert what can be called a mild presumption in favor of 
joint decisionmaking responsibility “if both parents have been exer-
cising a reasonable share of parenting functions.”99 The effect, again, 
is to use the concept of approximation to lend structure to the deci-
sionmaking process while presenting a stable environment for nego-
tiation in light of the steadily expressed norm that the family revolve 
around each parent’s relationship with the child. 
An important aspect of improving predictability in the custody 
decisionmaking process involves addressing the tension between the 
need for finality in child custody arrangements and the need for 
flexibility as a child’s needs and parents’ circumstances change over 
time.100 Typically, little attention is paid to the inevitability of such 
change in child custody orders. In fact, the laws of a number of 
states come down heavily on the side of lending stability to a child’s 
living arrangements by putting firm limits—even moratoria—on the 
possibility of modification once an order is set.101 In the context of 
the parenting plan, the Principles set out to encourage parents to an-
ticipate changes in their child’s needs and in their circumstances and 
to establish means for addressing these changes in advance without 
resorting to relitigation in court.102 In keeping with the preference 
for voluntary agreements in the Principles, any dispute resolution 
procedure that the parents can agree upon should be ordered by the 
court unless the agreement is not knowing or voluntary or would be 
harmful to the child.103 
In the event that the parents cannot agree on a dispute resolu-
tion procedure, the Principles give great deference to the parents’ re-
spective preferences and circumstances, while providing that a court 
 
 97. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06(1). 
 98. Id. § 2.10(1). 
 99. Id. at 13. 
 100. Id. at 3–5. 
 101. Id. § 2.18 cmt. a. 
 102. Id. at 8; § 2.11. The Principles also provide for court-ordered parenting services to 
facilitate the dispute resolution process. See id. § 2.08. 
 103. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.07(1). 
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may order a nonjudicial dispute resolution procedure.104 An entire 
section of chapter 2 is devoted to limiting the dispute resolution 
process in the event of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment; do-
mestic abuse; drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that interferes 
with caretaking;105 or persistent interference with the other parent’s 
access to the child.106 Furthermore, another subsection in chapter 2 
holds that a court should not require a parent to participate in any 
dispute resolution procedure that would require face-to-face meet-
ings with the other parent.107 These two provisions are designed to 
protect against eventual agreements that are coercive rather than 
truly voluntary.108 
The Principles next address the tension between the desirability 
of private ordering by the parties and the possible need for judicial 
exercise of the protective function109 by distinguishing dispute reso-
lution “procedures that have been agreed to in advance by the par-
ents from those that have been imposed by the court.”110 A decision 
reached by parents through a nonjudicial dispute resolution proce-
dure that they have agreed upon in advance is binding upon the par-
ents and must be enforced by the court unless it is harmful to the 
child, beyond the scope of the agreement on procedure, or the result 
of fraud, misconduct, corruption, or other serious irregularity.111 A 
decision reached by parents through a nonjudicial dispute resolution 
procedure ordered by the court and without parental agreement is 
subject to de novo review by the court.112 Thus, the parenting plan 
process as envisioned in the Principles sets forth a combination of (1) 
expressions of preference for voluntary agreements between parents, 
(2) channeling of parents who are able to agree upon a nonjudicial 
dispute resolution procedure into a structured decisionmaking proc-
ess that preserves and enhances the autonomy of the child’s family, 
and (3) facilitating guarantees that agreements on both process and 
 
 104. Id. § 2.11(2). 
 105. Note again that the rule is based upon conduct that affects the well-being of the 
child, not status of the parent. 
 106. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, §§ 2.11(1)(c), 2.13. 
 107. Id. § 2.08(2). 
 108. Id. at 204. 
 109. Id. at 5; see also Schneider, supra note 50, at 497. 
 110. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.11 cmt. c, at 205. 
 111. Id. § 2.11(2). 
 112. Id. 
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substance, if responsibly made, will be honored in the reordering of 
the child’s family. The Principles also manage to provide (4) protec-
tion for parents and for children from agreements that overreach or 
mislead, and (5) an arbitral process should one be needed. 
IV. “STRENGTHEN OR DECONSTRUCT?” 
The Reporter approaches the conceptual challenge of rulemaking 
in the area of child custody law by relying on a small number of key 
principles. She sees that challenge as one “to provide determinate 
and predictable outcomes that benefit children in the vast majority of 
cases without imposing standardized solutions that offend this soci-
ety’s commitment to pluralism and parental autonomy.”113 She relies 
on four principles to achieve this goal: (1) post-separation allocations 
of residential responsibility to each parent in approximate proportion 
to caretaking by that parent prior to separation;114 (2) parenting plan 
requirements “designed to transform proceedings about children at 
divorce from win-lose battles over children into planning events, in 
which roles for both parents are set forth and mechanisms for dealing 
with future conflict are established”;115 (3) “greater deference to pa-
rental agreements than is allowed currently in most jurisdictions”;116 
(4) “provisions to protect children and parents who have been vic-
tims of child or domestic abuse”;117 and (5) “the identification of in-
dividuals who are not legal parents but whose functional role as par-
ents warrants an allocation of responsibility for the child in some 
limited circumstances.”118 For purposes of this analysis of whether 
chapter 2 is likely to strengthen families, the focus will be limited to 
the first three of these principles. This is not to minimize the impor-
tance of the other two or to limit the scope of this analysis to the 
principles less likely to be controversial. Rather, it is to focus on the 
principles that have most immediately to do with the decisionmaking 
process. 
The transformation of proceedings about children at divorce into 
 
 113. Id., Reporter’s Memorandum, at xxiii. 
 114. Id. The Reporter notes that this principle runs throughout the draft, but is especially 
important in section 2.09. 
 115. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at xxiv (emphasis added) 
(citing id. §§ 2.06, 2.11). 
 116. Id. (citing id. § 2.07). 
 117. Id. (citing id. §§ 2.06(2), 2.07(2), 2.08, 2.13). 
 118. Id. (citing id. §§ 2.03(3), 2.04, 2.21). 
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planning events, and, in particular, the provisions in chapter 2 for 
resolution of future disputes, represent a key to the prospects for 
strengthening families in several respects. First, the provisions for 
resolution of future disputes are critical to the function of future 
child custody laws. They take the fundamental premise of the parent-
ing plan (that “the preservation of existing child-parent attachments 
after the break-up of a family unit is a critical factor in the child’s 
well-being,” and that “each parent ordinarily will play an important 
ongoing role in the child’s life”119) from rhetoric to action. In these 
provisions, we see the Principles adding the channeling function (in-
stitutionalizing the fundamental premise of the parenting plan; creat-
ing “a pattern of expected action of individuals or groups enforced 
by social sanctions, both positive and negative”)120 to the expressive 
function (“imparting ideas through words and symbols”).121 Second, 
the channeling of parents into institutionalized planning for changes 
in the needs and circumstances of the child’s family and predictable, 
structured decisionmaking options that are responsive to the needs 
of a particular family creates what may be a necessary framework for 
prospects of future cooperation in parenting. This is the “movement 
toward better judgment” that Professor Mnookin hoped for in 
1975, and it indicates that the Reporter has found that many of the 
judges and decisionmakers on whom she relies are learning from the 
process of decision. 
A. Dispute Resolution and Game Theory 
It may be instructive to consider the dispute resolution proce-
dures set forth in chapter 2 by considering chapter 2 from the per-
spective of the study of decisionmaking strategies in the discipline of 
behavioral science. In his book The Evolution of Cooperation,122 
Professor Robert Axelrod considers how, in situations where each 
individual has an incentive to be selfish, cooperation develops. Pro-
fessor Axelrod proposes that there are strategies for conduct and the 
regulation of conduct that transcend Hobbes’s world of selfish indi-
 
 119. Id. at 8. 
 120. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 8. “[T]he channeling 
function does not specifically require people to use these social institutions, although it may 
offer incentives and disincentives for their use.” Id. 
 121. See Schneider, supra note 50, at 498. 
 122. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
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viduals in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”123 
He studies a basic social problem—situations in which “the pursuit 
of self-interest by each leads to a poor outcome for all,”124 and con-
siders a classic representation of such a situation, the Prisoner’s Di-
lemma game.125 Of the choices facing a player in the game, Professor 
Axelrod states:  
As long as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very diffi-
cult. That is why an important way to promote cooperation is to ar-
range that the same two individuals will meet each other again, and 
to recall how the other has behaved until now. This continuing in-
teraction is what makes it possible for cooperation based on recip-
rocity to be stable.126 
In fact, the situation of parents dealing with custody of a child 
is—or should be—more of a durable, iterated, non-zero-sum dis-
pute. The parenting plan, as set forth in section 2.06 of the ALI 
Principles, is intended, in the Reporter’s words, “to transform pro-
ceedings about children at divorce from win-lose battles over chil-
dren into planning events, in which roles for both parents are set 
forth and mechanisms for dealing with future conflicts are estab-
lished.”127 This is child custody expressed as a non-zero-sum dispute. 
To the extent that it succeeds in establishing a relationship between 
parents that is responsive to the frequently changing needs of parents 
and children, it expresses child custody as a durable, iterated non-
zero-sum dispute.128 
 
 123. Id. at 4 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. I, ch. 13, at 84 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1996) (1651)). 
 124. Id. at 7. 
 125. Id. 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, there are two players. Each has two choices, 
namely to cooperate or defect. Each must make the choice without knowing what 
the other will do. No matter what the other does, defection yields a higher payoff 
than cooperation. The dilemma is that if both defect, both do worse than if both 
had cooperated. 
Id. To “defect” is to act in an exclusively self-interested, and therefore uncooperative, manner. 
 126. Id. at 125. 
 127. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, Reporter’s Memorandum, 
at xxiv. 
 128. Id. § 2.02. Here the Principles act to facilitate the continuity of existing parent-child 
attachments, see id. § 2.02(b), and to facilitate continuing meaningful contact between the 
child and each parent, see id. § 2.02(c). See also section 2.11, which anticipates changes in the 
needs and circumstances of parents and children, and presumptively involving both parents in 
the process of planning for such changes and agreeing to an impasse mechanism should one be 
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Professor Axelrod’s research indicates that reciprocity is the most 
successful strategy in a long-term, non-zero-sum relationship. (Ide-
ally, parenthood is such a relationship.) Applying game theory to 
child custody, the rules of conduct for successful ongoing interaction 
between parents concerning caretaking and decisionmaking respon-
sibilities for their child would be as follows: 
1. Cooperate as long as the other parent cooperates; defect if the 
other parent defects. 
2. Never defect first. 
3. A parent should not rate success against the other parent’s 
success; instead, rate success from the child’s perspective (pa-
rental cooperation is success), or from the perspective of an-
other parent in identical circumstances. 
4. Be as straightforward and predictable as possible.129 
Because there are important consequences for others any time 
one of the parents defects, the rules for parental interaction (such as 
the parental plan or the dispute resolution procedure) cannot be al-
lowed to take a laissez-faire approach to this process, trusting to each 
parent’s fiduciary tendencies, enlightened self-interest, rational con-
duct, or even understanding of the strategic implications of one’s 
conduct. How, then, can the strategic setting be altered to promote 
cooperation between parents? Axelrod would suggest that coopera-
tion would be promoted by (1) making the future more important, 
relative to the present, (2) changing the payoffs, or consequences, 
for each possible parental action, and (3) teaching parents (and oth-
ers) particular values, facts, and skills relevant to cooperation in a 
child custody dispute.130 
B. Making the Future More Important 
Axelrod states that “[m]utual cooperation can be stable if the fu-
ture is sufficiently important relative to the present.”131 He notes that 
one player in a Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario will typically take a 
chance and defect because the player will conclude that the future 
gain to be realized from cooperation is less attractive than the pre-
sent gain. The preference for short-term gain is typically because the 
 
needed. 
 129. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 109–23. 
 130. Id. at 124. 
 131. Id. at 126. 
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player perceives his relationship with the other player as fleeting—
not lasting beyond the present interaction—or because the player 
prefers the benefit in hand to the idea of waiting for some benefit in 
the future.132 In making rules to enhance cooperation between the 
parties, the attractiveness of a defection in the short-term (in custody 
terms, any self-interested act by one parent tending to undermine 
the parents’ joint parenting of the child) can be lessened by ensuring 
that the interaction between the parents is continual and by making 
the future payoff more attractive than the present payoff. Axelrod 
notes that this can be accomplished by making the interactions both 
more durable and more frequent. 
Durable interaction “allows patterns of cooperation which are 
based on reciprocity to be worth trying and allows them to become 
established.”133 Axelrod gives the example of soldiers on both sides 
in the trenches during World War One developing cooperative rela-
tionships during lulls in the fighting. “They knew their interactions 
would continue because nobody was going anywhere.”134 It is axio-
matic in the study of negotiation that “[w]hen bargaining is repeti-
tive, each disputant must be particularly concerned about his reputa-
tion, and hence, luckily for society, repetitive bargaining is often 
done more cooperatively (and honestly) than single-shot bargain-
ing.”135 Even if there is a high degree of hostility between parents, 
each will develop a reputation with the other over time, and, there-
fore, each has an interest in protecting that reputation.136 
The likelihood of a defection can also be diminished by increas-
ing the frequency of the interactions between parents. Axelrod notes 
that the sooner the next interaction between disputants, the larger it 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 129. 
 134. AXELROD, supra note 122, at 129. 
 135. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 13 (1982). 
 136. The word “reputation,” as it is used in this context, has more to do with the pre-
dictability of interactions between parents than with their respective reputations in the com-
munity for honesty or cooperativeness. Raiffa goes on to point out that it is not always true 
that the parties’ concern for their respective reputations in repetitive bargaining results in hon-
est, cooperative bargaining. 
[T]here is always the possibility that some inadvertent, careless friction can fester 
and spoil the atmosphere for future bargaining; this is especially true where there are 
differences in the information available to both sides. With repetition, a negotiator 
might want to establish a reputation for toughness that is designed for long-term 
rather than short-term rewards. 
Id. 
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looms in their respective consciousnesses.137 He suggests two effec-
tive ways of increasing the frequency of interactions. One is to keep 
other parties away from the players so that a higher percentage of 
each player’s interactions are with the other player.138 The other is to 
break down the issues between the parties into small pieces—so that 
many small reciprocal moves are required rather than one or two 
large ones.139 The theory is that each small successful interaction be-
tween the players builds each player’s confidence in the process, in-
vests each player in the accomplishments in hand, and provides each 
player with information from which to predict the actions of the 
other. Here Axelrod also addresses the common concern about 
cheating, or breaching one’s duties under an agreement—an impor-
tant consideration in child custody disputes. He points out that small 
interactions over a long duration allow each party to reassure herself 
or himself about breaches by the other with less at stake with each 
potential breach.140 
Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles would act to make the future 
more important relative to the present for parents working at an 
agreement on caretaking and decisionmaking responsibilities in sev-
eral respects. First, the expressive function of the core concepts of 
the parenting plan—that “the preservation of existing child-parent 
attachments after the break-up of a family unit is a critical factor in 
the child’s well-being,” and that “each parent ordinarily will play an 
important ongoing role in the child’s life”—has been noted al-
ready.141 Again, the structured decisionmaking process set forth in 
chapter 2 channels parents into a durable interaction. The durability 
of that interaction is institutionalized by the planning process pre-
scribed142 and by the provisions for resolution of future disputes set 
forth in the chapter.143 The level of detail demanded by the parenting 
plan144 provides for sharing of information between parents, thereby 
 
 137. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 129. 
 138. Id. at 130. 
 139. Id. at 132. 
 140. Id. “Decomposing the interaction promotes the stability of cooperation by making 
the gains from cheating on the current move less important relative to the gains from potential 
mutual cooperation on later moves.” Id. 
 141. See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 142. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06. 
 143. Id. §§ 2.08, 2.11. 
 144. Id. § 2.06(1)(a)–(h); see also § 2.06(3). Note particularly the provisions for defining 
common ground in section 2.06(1)(h). 
1CAT.DOC 1/3/02  2:54 PM 
857] The Parenting Plan 
  881 
reducing the likelihood of breaches of agreed-upon duties, and pro-
vides a textured background for frequent interactions over the term 
of the child’s dependency. The family autonomy145 and structured 
decisionmaking146 provisions in chapter 2 serve, in a sense, to keep 
others—in this case the courts, and anyone else involved in the dis-
pute resolution process who might undermine parental autonomy—
away from the “players.” Furthermore, the presumptions of sufficient 
custodial responsibility to enable each parent to maintain a relation-
ship with the child147 and the presumption that, if each of a child’s 
legal parents has been exercising a reasonable share of parenting 
functions, joint decisionmaking by the parents is in the child’s best 
interests148 and paves the way for more frequent interactions between 
parents. 
C. Changing the Payoffs 
This is where the State comes into the durable (iterated), non-
zero-sum relationship between parents. It is where the expressive and 
channeling functions of the law take precedence. Axelrod points out 
that one of the primary functions of government is “to make sure 
that when individuals do not have private incentives to cooperate, 
they will be required to do the socially useful thing anyway.”149 
When the costs of adhering to a particular standard of conduct are 
direct and the benefits (or, in game theory language, the payoffs) are 
diffuse, the chances of a party not adhering to the standard of con-
duct are high. Where adherence to the standard of conduct in ques-
tion has high social utility, government is needed to step in and 
make the choice of nonadherence to the standard of conduct (defec-
tion) less attractive. Government can take a heavy-handed approach 
to this intervention,150 but it need not do so. In a durable (iterated) 
interaction, there can still be a tension between the short-term incen-
tive to defect and the long-term incentive to cooperate, as long as 
 
 145. Id. §§ 2.08, 2.11. 
 146. Id. §§ 2.07, 2.09 (particularly the approximation concept), 2.10, 2.13,  and 2.14. 
 147. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.09(1)(a). 
 148. Id. § 2.10(2) and (4). 
 149. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 133. 
 150. Id. at 134. “If the punishment for defection is so great that cooperation is the best 
choice in the short run, no matter what the other player does, then there is no longer a di-
lemma.” Id. 
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the latter is greater.151 
In applying this theory to child custody dispute resolution, one 
must ask three questions: (1) What would be the short-term incen-
tive to defect?; (2) What would be the long-term incentive to coop-
erate?; and (3) How can the payoff be altered? 
The short-term incentive to defect for parents in a child custody 
dispute could be anything from retribution for real or imagined 
slights in the dissolution of the marriage to attempts to woo the af-
fections of the child in question. 
As for long-term incentives to cooperate, one could accept the 
premise put forth by Professor Scott, that “the sense of moral re-
sponsibility to one’s own children continues to be important to most 
persons.”152 Alternatively, one could accept Professor Bartlett’s ex-
hortations about “parental dispositions toward generosity and other-
directedness.”153 While these may seem like Pollyanna sentiments, 
particularly to hard-boiled practitioners of custody litigation, a 
strong argument can be made that for many parents they represent 
an ideal to be pursued whenever possible in their dealings with their 
children.154 Long-term incentives to cooperate can also be less altru-
istic. If the parents come to appreciate that cooperation will be less 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. See Scott, supra note 12, at 91. 
 153. See Bartlett, supra note 54, at 294. 
 154. Notwithstanding Professor DiFonzo’s dismissal of “this assumption of enhanced 
parental commitment surfacing after marital dissolution,” which he characterizes (quoting 
Henry James) as “after being perfectly insignificant together . . . , [they] would be decidedly 
striking apart.” James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 931 n.332 
(2000) (quoting HENRY JAMES, WHAT MAISIE KNEW 1–2 (1897)). See Professor Bartlett’s 
discussion of the tension between parental rights and parental responsibilities, in which she 
cites 
Nel Nodding[s’] find[ing] [of] a basis for free action in our longing for caring and 
relationship, which motivates us to do what we ought to do to maintain caring rela-
tionships. . . . Within the context of the parent-child relationship, Noddings’ con-
cept of caring suggests that parents are free to (and should) bind themselves to act 
according to their most ennobled sense of what parenthood requires. This binding 
occurs within a social milieu which creates and sustains the ideals parents internalize 
as part of their “ennobled selves.” 
Bartlett, supra note 54, at 300–01. Bartlett goes on to conclude: 
[t]he moral growth that comes from being held accountable for one’s actions, in 
turn, derives at least in part from the perception that one’s actions are voluntary. 
The choice to act morally is self-reinforcing, creating momentum for acting morally 
on the next occasion, and the next, and strengthening the foundation upon which 
future moral actions will be based. 
Id. 
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contentious, less expensive, less subjective,155 or more just, any or all 
of these incentives can lead to cooperation. 
As for altering the payoff, the Reporter is cautious about “the 
limited role the law can effectively play in resolving disputes over the 
care and control of children.”156 She notes that “[e]ven if there were 
consensus on what parenting practices were best for children, parents 
cannot be made to love their children, nor can they be supervised in 
all of their encounters with them,”157 but goes on to state that “the 
law can attempt to stimulate, or at least not inhibit, the motivations 
of parents to do well by their children. It does this by respecting the 
decisions parents have made about their children in the past and by 
encouraging their planning for their children’s future.”158 It is here, 
perhaps, that chapter 2 comes closest to falling short. Altering the 
payoff may be accomplished either by increasing incentives for long-
term cooperation159 or by increasing disincentives for short-term de-
fection.160 It may be that out of deference for autonomous family de-
cisionmaking the Reporter has been reluctant to bring the conse-
quences for defection to the fore. In the following section on 
teaching values, facts, and skills to alter the strategic setting and 
promote cooperation between parents, the need for an effective im- 
passe mechanism—and for its shadow in which to bargain161—
becomes more apparent. 
 
 155. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 849. 
 156. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 16. 
 157. Id. at 26; see also id. §§ 2.08, 2.11. 
 158. Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
 159. Id. Attempts to increase incentives for long-term cooperation can be seen in the ex-
pressions of the importance of continuing involvement of both parents in the child’s life. See 
id. §§ 2.02 (Objectives), 2.06 (Parenting Plan), 2.07 (Parental Agreements), 2.08 (Court-
Ordered Services), 2.09 (Custodial Responsibility), 2.10 (Decisionmaking Responsibility). 
There are also incentives for long-term cooperation inherent in the perception, should it de-
velop as intended, that the parenting plan approach is less expensive, less contentious, more 
fair, etc. 
 160. Id. at 26. In a durable interaction, such as that provided under the parenting plan 
provisions in sections 2.06 and 2.11, reciprocity provides a disincentive for short-term defec-
tion. See  AXELROD, supra note 130. 
 161. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 39. 
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D. Teaching Values, Facts, and Skills 
1. Values 
Axelrod focuses upon the social ideal of altruism, which he de-
fines as “the phenomenon of one person’s utility being positively af-
fected by another person’s welfare.”162 He discusses the desirability 
of one generation of a society shaping the values of the next genera-
tion so that the next generation will consider the welfare of others as 
well as their own welfare.163 He notes that “altruism can be sustained 
through socialization.”164 He considers the benefits of altruism both 
in terms of real life as well as game theory: “[A] society of such car-
ing people will have an easier time attaining cooperation among its 
members, even when caught in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.”165 
This teaching of values could take any of a number of forms. It 
could refer to programs in schools that teach about human interac-
tion with the aim of increasing civility.166 It could refer to parenting 
programs that teach parents to aspire to conduct conforming with 
their best hopes rather than their worst fears.167 Or it could simply 
 
 162. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 135; see also Bartlett, supra note 8. 
 163. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 135. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See, e.g., Wendy Schwartz, Developing Social Competence in Children, at 
http://iume.tc.columbia.edu/choices/briefs/choices03.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2001); Nel 
Noddings, Learning to Care and to Be Cared For, in SCHOOLS, VIOLENCE, AND SOCIETY 
185–98 (Allan M. Hoffman ed., 1996). 
 167. Note that ALI Principles section 2.08 calls for the court to inform parents about 
“the impact of family dissolution on children and how the needs of children facing family dis-
solution can be best addressed.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 
2.08. Comment a to section 2.08 envisions parenting education programs that would “not 
only facilitate the process of reaching mutual agreement for the benefit of the child but also 
give the parents additional insight about their children’s special needs during a period that is 
often extraordinarily upsetting and unstable.” Id. at 93; see also Sarah H. Ramsey, High-
Conflict Custody Cases: Reforming the System for Children, 39 FAM. C. REV. 146 (2001); 
Andrew Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programs and the Unified Family Court: A 
Public Health Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 95, 109 n.34 (1998) (“The Association of Family 
and Conciliation Courts published a Directory of Parent Education Programs in 1997 contain-
ing program names, addresses and basic organizational information. The Directory is available 
from AFCC at 329 W. Wilson Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53703.”); Joan B. Kelly, The De-
termination of Child Custody in the USA, at http://www.wwlia.org/us-cus4.htm (last modi-
fied July 30, 1997) (“Whether they are in dispute or not, educational programs designed to 
provide divorcing parents with information about the impact of divorce on children, the effects 
of conflict on their children, how to keep their children out of their conflicts, and information 
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refer to the expressive function of the dispute resolution system. The 
parenting plan in chapter 2 has a complex altruistic premise that has 
been mentioned repeatedly elsewhere in this article.168 The Reporter 
notes that meaningful contact between a child and both parents or-
dinarily is good for the child’s development and sense of identity, as 
well as for the nonresidential parent, who also will be more likely to 
feel a continued responsibility to contribute to the child in financial 
support and otherwise than one who lacks all contact with the 
child.169 These are key instances of the expressive function—the 
teaching of values—built into chapter 2. 
Axelrod also notes the danger of individuals who “receive the 
benefits of another’s altruism” but do “not pay the welfare costs of 
being generous in return.”170 He suggests that this cost of altruism 
can be controlled “by being altruistic to everyone at first, and there-
after only to those who show similar feelings.”171 This leads to the 
need to alter the strategy by teaching facts. 
2. Facts 
Axelrod’s research demonstrates that in a durable, non-zero-sum 
relationship, reciprocity is the most effective strategy. He evaluates 
many different strategies that have been tried in contest with a strict 
reciprocal strategy172 and describes unvarying success for a reciprocal 
strategy. While this might appear to be a somewhat inappropriate 
approach where the physical, emotional, psychological, social, and 
even spiritual and moral well-being of children is at stake, Axelrod 
 
regarding various custodial and parenting arrangements are important. Such programs can be 
offered through nonprofit agencies in communities, through churches, or can be sponsored by 
the courts. Good resource and training materials incorporating written, video, and discussion 
elements have been developed that ensure balanced, comprehensive programs. While it would 
be optimal if all divorcing parents could participate in these brief programs, it should be re-
quired of all parents disputing custody or access prior to entering mediation or initiating litiga-
tion.”); see also Department of Conciliation Services, Washington County, Oregon, My spouse 
and I are divorcing, at http://www.co.washington.or.us/deptmts/juvenile/divorce.htm (last 
modified Jan. 19, 2001); Cooperative Parenting for Divided Families, at http://trfn. 
clpgh.org/cpdf (last modified May 15, 2001); California Courts Self-Help Center, General 
Advice for Creating Parenting Plans and Parenting After a Divorce or Separation, at 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/family/custody/advice (last visited Sept. 21, 2001). 
 168. See supra note 79. 
 169. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.02 cmt. f, at 27. 
 170. AXELROD, supra note 122, at 135. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 118–20. 
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makes a convincing case that the Golden Rule—a rule calling for al-
truistic behavior toward the other in the hope of reciprocity—“can 
not only hurt you, but it can hurt other innocent bystanders,”173 
such as the children at issue. “Unconditional cooperation tends to 
spoil the other player; it leaves a burden on the rest of the commu-
nity to reform the spoiled player, suggesting that reciprocity is a bet-
ter foundation for morality than is unconditional cooperation.”174
 Reciprocity, according to Axelrod, is an effective strategy in a du-
rable, iterated, non-zero-sum relationship not because it achieves tri-
umph over the other player, but because it elicits cooperation from 
the other player.175 It does so “by promoting the mutual interest 
rather than by exploiting the other’s weakness.”176 In other words, 
properly taught, a parent learns not to win (as in a zero-sum game), 
but to “win-win”—to cooperate. To this end, Axelrod would sug-
gest teaching parents the rules of conduct set forth above to help 
channel the parties through the process, to help the community en-
force its expectations for the process, and to help make the law more 
effective in eliciting cooperation in the process: 
1. Cooperate as long as the other parent cooperates; defect if the 
other parent defects. 
2. Never defect first. 
3. A parent should not rate success against the other parent’s 
success; instead, rate success from the child’s perspective (pa-
rental cooperation is success), or from the perspective of an-
other parent in identical circumstances. 
4. Be as straightforward and predictable as possible. 
Parents should be taught, then, under the provisions for court-
ordered services in section 2.08, how to negotiate with one another. 
Courts could provide for programs that empower parents by explic-
itly teaching them that reciprocity in a durable, iterated, non-zero-
sum relationship promotes cooperation. This principle would cer-
tainly not be lost on the family law bar, which has long seen itself as 
having a responsibility to educate its clients. 
Axelrod acknowledges one danger of reciprocity that must be 
considered in the context of any interaction having to do with an 
 
 173. Id. at 136. 
 174. Id. 
 175. AXELROD, supra note 122, at 137. 
 176. Id. 
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event as potentially emotionally charged as the dissolution of a mar-
riage: the danger of a spiral of mutual defection, or feud. But he 
notes that, “in situations where people can rely on a central authority 
to enforce the community standards . . . by guaranteeing the pun-
ishment of any individual who tries to be less than cooperative, the 
deviant strategy will not thrive, and will not provide an attractive 
model for others to imitate.”177 In the context of child custody dis-
pute resolution, the term “punishment” must be read to mean the 
creation of disincentives for parents inclined to defect from the proc-
ess. Axelrod is clear, and common sense and experience support the 
idea, that when parties are at an impasse in the process, a “central au-
thority” may have to be called upon “to enforce the community 
standards.”178 What is perhaps needed in chapter 2, in order to ad-
dress such deviant strategies and the impasses resulting from them 
while remaining true to the principles family interdependence in-
forming and inspiring chapter 2,179 is a dispute resolution process 
with an impasse mechanism that would reflect and reinforce that in-
terdependence. Chapter 2 interposes a brilliant array of alternatives 
to “win-lose battles over children.”180 What is perhaps needed to im-
plement chapter 2 effectively is an explicit reference to a dispute 
resolution procedure that would incorporate its principles without 
having to resort to the inadequacies of adjudication.181 
3. Skills 
Here Axelrod addresses the ability of one player to recognize an-
other particular player from the past and to summon up that player’s 
past conduct to inform the current negotiations.182 As this relates to 
child custody decisionmaking, it involves the knowledge and experi-
ence aspects of skill. A parent must first be able to take what she has 
learned about how cooperation works in a durable, non-zero-sum 
(parental) relationship and then factor in his or her experiences with 
 
 177. Id. at 138. 
 178. Id. 
 179. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at xxiv. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. § 2.02 cmt. b, at 31. This reference is to another article by the author: Account-
ing to Ourselves for Ourselves: An Analysis of Adjudication in the Resolution of Child Custody 
Disputes, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1228 (1992). See the proposal for a negotiatory impasse mecha-
nism at page 1266. 
 182. AXELROD, supra note 122, at 140. 
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the other parent, with the child, and with the legal system. This 
process results in the development of skills for use throughout the 
duration of the relationship. “[T]he scope of sustainable cooperation 
can be expanded by any improvements in the players’ abilities to rec-
ognize each other from the past, and to be confident about the prior 
actions that actually have been taken.”183 Applying this theory to 
child custody dispute resolution, parents must learn the skill of rec-
ognition of successful coparenting across the seeming chasm of di-
vorce or estrangement. They must learn to measure success in terms 
of effective cooperation between two disparate approaches to parent-
ing the same child. They must learn to distinguish between an over-
sight, or false-step, and a breach of faith with the cooperative parent-
ing process. They must learn to build a re-ordered relationship 
around the emerging history of successes and failures in that relation-
ship, and they must learn the value of behaving predictably in that 
relationship. They must learn to value and respect the autonomy of 
the re-ordered family as they valued and insisted upon the autonomy 
of the intact family. 
Chapter 2 is uniquely well-suited to teaching the participants 
these skills. Its emphasis on predictability, structured decisionmaking 
(and particularly the concept of approximation), family autonomy, 
and planning for the future of the child’s family provide a forum for 
the use of these skills and provide incentives for their use.184 Its pro-
visions for structured decisionmaking and future planning in particu-
lar allow for the teaching of these skills.185 The semantic and concep-
tual changes in chapter 2186 are indicative of an approach that would 
seek, through the expressive and channeling functions of the law, to 
teach parents not to measure their success against the other parent’s 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
 185. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, §§ 2.06, 2.08, 2.09 (par-
ticularly the approximation concept), 2.10, 2.13, 2.14. 
 186. One comment describes a key change in terminology.  Id. § 2.03 cmt. d, at 47. An-
other key conceptual change is seen in the parenting plan put forward in section 2.06, which is 
described in comment a as (1) “encourag[ing] [parents] to anticipate their children’s needs 
and make arrangements for them”; (2) “locat[ing] responsibility for the welfare of children in 
parents rather than in courts”; (3) “presuppos[ing][] and affirm[ing][] a diversity of childrear-
ing arrangements”; (4) “encourag[ing] parents to customize their arrangements to take ac-
count of the family’s own actual circumstances”; and (5)—though “not intended to be oner-
ous”—ask[ing] more of parents than is traditionally required. Id. § 2.06 cmt a, at 66–67 
(emphasis added). 
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success, but instead to recognize success from the perspective of the 
relationship, or that of the child, or from the perspective of any par-
ent in her or his exact circumstances. Axelrod’s approach would sug-
gest the implementation of procedures or programs under section 
2.08 that would explicitly communicate these skills to parents and 
would help parents learn that it is in their long-term interest to disci-
pline themselves to be as straightforward and predictable as possible 
in their dealings concerning custody of the child. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the past twenty-five years, we have learned much about the 
legal system of decision concerning parental relationships with chil-
dren. At the same time, behavioral scientists have learned much 
about the process of decision and about the problem of cooperation 
in particular. Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution, with its emphasis on the parenting plan, has moved 
boldly away from much of what is problematic or counterproductive 
to the process of decision in parenting. It embraces much of what we 
have learned (and are learning) works for families and children. And 
it has laid the groundwork for a move away from child custody adju-
dication—a process that has proven largely ineffective and unrespon-
sive to the needs of “dissolving” families. Should the concept of the 
parenting plan be embraced by more state legislatures,187 the next 
twenty-five years will likely see a shift away from the troublesome ap-
plication of judicial discretion to parent-child relationships and to-
ward creative uses of education, negotiation, and planning in re-
ordering those relationships. 
 
 187. For a list of states that currently have some form of parenting plan in effect, see 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06 cmts. a–b, at 74–79. 
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